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ABSTRACT: Stephen Toulmin’s use of a judicial model for argumentation in The Uses of Argument means that he 
is introducing the complexity of rhetorical appeals to the hitherto logic-based study of argumentation, including the 
appeal to the emotions, pathos. Toulmin’s acknowledgment of the role of the emotions in practical reasoning moves 
from being implicit in The Uses of Argument to becoming more explicit in Toulmin’s Return to Reason: ‘Warm 
hearts allied with cool heads seek a middle way between the extremes of abstract theory and personal impulse’ 
(2001, p. 214). This paper analyzes the hidden role of pathos in Toulmin’s distinction between rationality and 
reasonableness, particularly as it appears in Cosmopolis and his later works. To Toulmin’s characterization of the 
oral, particular, local, and timely nature of reasonableness, I add Peter Goldie’s notions of intelligibility, 
appropriateness, and proportionality of emotions to describe what role emotions play in reasonable argumentation. 
Using as a case study the victim impact testimony in Timothy McVeigh’s Oklahoma City bombing trial, I argue that 
in certain situations and fields of argumentation, pathos—or data with a high emotional content—is warranted in a 
reasonable argument, and that it would be unreasonable to exclude such data. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the ways that Stephen Toulmin distinguishes his project in The Uses of Argument (1958) 
from standard logic theory is to change the model of reasoning on which argumentation theory is 
based. Logicians, he argues, take as their model mathematical reasoning: ‘an argument is made 
of propositions, and the logician’s objects of study are the formal relations between propositions; 
to ask whether an argument is valid is to ask whether it is of the right form, and the study of form 
is best undertaken in a self-consciously mathematical manner’ (1958, p. 6). Toulmin posits, 
instead, a jurisprudential model of argumentation: ‘Logic (we may say) is generalised 
jurisprudence. Arguments can be compared with law-suits, and the claims we make and argue for 
in extra-legal contexts with claims made in the courts’ (1958, p.7). Indeed, Toulmin rejects an 
analogical relation between jurisprudence and argumentation as being too weak, arguing instead 
that ‘law-suits are just a special kind of rational dispute, for which the procedures and rules of 
argumentation have hardened into institutions’ (1958, pp. 7-8). Using judicial argumentation as a 
model helps Toulmin clarify points about field dependency and the layout of arguments, as well 
as demonstrate the complexity of practical arguments in non-theoretical situations. 
Real-world models, however, have a way of bringing unintentional as well as intentional 
features into the discussion. Aristotle claims that judicial cases are more open to irrelevant 
emotional appeals than legislative deliberations (trans. 1991, sect. 1354b), and while he may be 
overstating the disinterestedness of legislators, actual court cases often show a tension between 
the emotional investments of participants and the legal limitations on permissible considerations. 
What judicial argumentation shows us is that the outcome of trials is not always dependent on a 
THE HIDDEN ROLE OF PATHOS IN TOULMIN’S LAYOUT OF ARGUMENTS 347 
strictly rational weighing of the facts and the law. Trial by a jury of one’s peers means that the 
human element creeps in. 
In this essay I argue that Toulmin’s understanding of argumentation and reasonableness 
open the door to the consideration of emotional data in argumentation. I then examine the role of 
pathos in rhetoric, and connect Toulmin’s understanding of reasonableness being oral, particular, 
local, and timely to Peter Goldie’s discussion of the intelligibility, appropriateness, and 
proportionality of emotions. Finally, I demonstrate how this framework of the role of emotion in 
argumentation applies to arguments about victim impact testimony in the 1997 capital trial of 
Timothy McVeigh for bombing the Alfred R. Murrah building in Oklahoma City. I conclude that 
argumentative pathos is not just an attempt to sway the jury or audience, but can function as a 
mechanism to insure the reasonableness of important deliberations.  
 
1. TOULMIN ON ARGUMENTATION AND REASONABLENESS 
 
There are two senses in which Toulmin’s understanding of argumentation leaves open the 
possibility of pathos in practical argument. In The Uses of Argument, Toulmin is more concerned 
with the structure of substantial arguments and showing why they cannot be reduced to analytical 
terms than with exploring the characteristic concerns of practical argumentation. However, while 
he does not directly address the possible role of pathos in practical argumentation, Toulmin 
implicitly leaves room for it in his description of the field-dependence of warrants and their 
backing. In some areas of argumentation, warrants allowing emotion-laden ‘data’ are accepted, 
and in some they are not. Thus, in mathematics—Toulmin’s archetypical example of a field 
operating in the purely logical realm—emotions are irrelevant; it does not matter to the formal 
validity of a proof whether the mathematician or her audience are angry, prejudiced, or patriotic 
when they write or read it. A field in which emotion-allowing warrants are rife is politics: in the 
2004 U.S. presidential election, for example, all the intellectual argumentation about issues such 
as the economy, civil liberties, and the environment could not overcome the insistent drumbeat 
of emotional appeals to ‘moral values’ and the ‘war on terrorism.’ A minor example of this in 
The Uses of Argument is his discussion of ’you can’t talk about a fox’s tail’: while Toulmin 
characterizes this as a ‘terminological impropriety’ (1958, p. 25), it might also be discussed as an 
appeal to class prejudice—as classic an example of pathos as one could wish for. More 
important, perhaps, is his repeated use of judicial parallels and examples throughout the text, 
which I argue is a venue through which emotion-laden data enter the study of argumentation. 
Clearly, in the case of victim impact testimony that I discuss here, emotionally laden testimony 
becomes part of the judicial process.  
In his later works, Toulmin’s disassociation of idealized logic from working logic is 
expanded into a distinction between rationality and reasonableness. Rationality is held up by 
modernist philosophers and scientists as the model or ideal for reasoning: it is timeless, 
universal, impersonal, and highly theoretical. In Cosmopolis, Toulmin (1990) traces its 
development as an intellectual ideal back to the New Science initiated by Isaac Newton and the 
New Philosophy initiated by Rene Descartes. Toulmin argues that the closer rationality—in the 
form of a ‘science’ of logic—gets to universal, timeless certainty, the further away it is from 
being able to meaningfully describe practical reasoning in everyday life (1958, pp. 2-3). Hence, 
he distinguishes a different intellectual ideal, reasonableness, which he associates with humanist 
philosophers such as Michel de Montaigne. Reasonableness encompasses the way that reasoning 
happens in the world: it is often oral, retaining its rhetorical connection to speaker and audience; 
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particular, in that it deals with specific cases rather than abstract principles; local, in Clifford 
Geertz’s sense of being culturally and historically specific; and timely, in that it is bound by 
occasion and exigency (1988, pp. 338-341; 1990, pp. 186-189). Reasonableness, applicability to 
daily life, is exactly what Toulmin argues logic lost as philosophers pursued an idealized, 
theoretical logic divorced from the vagaries of imprecise language and specific situations. As I 
will argue in the next section, bringing human situatedness into considerations of reasonableness 
necessarily brings in human emotions—not as destroyers of reason, as they have often been 
characterized in both past and present—but as elements in the reasoning process. 
My own sense of where pathos fits into reasonableness is confirmed in the 2001 book 
Return to Reason, where Toulmin finally characterizes his ongoing critique of the logical ideal of 
rationality as a ‘rhetoric of philosophy’ (p. 12). Here, Toulmin associates ‘practical 
philosophy’—dedicated to an ideal of reasonableness—with clinical practice and social action. 
His description of a ‘’practical’ philosopher’ is one ‘who sees philosophical theories as relevant 
to our problems not because they provide formal solutions to abstract queries, but because they 
confer practical and concrete meaning on the lives of individuals, and families, and political 
communities’ (2001, p.214). Finally, then, Toulmin grounds reasonableness in an almost 
Ciceronian union of rhetoric and philosophy: ‘The future belongs not so much to the pure 
thinkers who are content—at best—with optimistic or pessimistic slogans; it is a province, 
rather, for reflective practitioners who are ready to act on their ideals. Warm hearts allied with 
cool heads seek a middle way between the extremes of abstract theory and personal impulse’ 
(2001, p. 214). With this eloquent witness to reasonableness, I would like to explore for a bit the 
role of pathos in rhetoric, and what that tells us about the use of the emotions in argumentation. 
 
2. PATHOS AND CONTEMPORARY VIEWS OF THE EMOTIONS 
 
From the beginning of codifications of rhetoric, the use of appeals to the emotions has been 
explained, contested, and, often, excoriated. Aristotle considers arousing pathos, emotion, as one 
of the three means of persuasion created by the speaker in the body of his or her speech (trans. 
1991; sect. 1356a), the others being logos, the reasoning in the speech, and ēthos, an appeal to 
the credibility and authority of the speaker. Although he warns against ‘warp[ing] the jury by 
leading them into anger or envy or pity: that is the same as if someone made a straightedge rule 
crooked before using it’ (trans. 1991, sect. 1354a), he proceeds in Book II of On Rhetoric to tell 
speakers exactly how to do that. Aristotle analyzes how to use the emotions in argumentation 
according to three characteristics: the state of mind of the person experiencing the emotion, the 
object of the emotion (against or toward whom or what it is experienced), and the reasons we 
feel emotions (trans. 1991, sect. 1378a). Jeffrey Walker describes Aristotelian pathos as ‘neither 
wholly propositional nor strictly ‘syllogistic’, nor is it wholly under the rule of logos, 
reason….But because the process is describable, one can still contrive a technē/pharmakon 
[art/drug] that can, at least in principle, produce a katharsis [manifestation or forcing-out] of 
pathos—not of any pathos whatsoever at any time but of the specific pathos or the pathē latent 
in the emotional potentialities of a given person at a given moment’ (2000, p. 81). The use of 
pathetic appeals in rhetoric, then, is both an insertion of the facts of human emotions into an 
argumentative structure and the use of the emotions to sway the audience’s judgment in the 
desired direction.  
One could argue that these are not separate enterprises. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
for example, argue that we cannot think of humans as being ‘made up of a set of completely 
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independent faculties’ (1958/1969, p. 47). They therefore claim that the strict distinction between 
logical argumentation aimed at reason and persuasion aimed at the emotions is false, a matter of 
degree rather than kind. So one contribution that rhetoricians make in discussing the role of the 
emotions in argumentation is to accept a more nuanced relation of emotions to reason, rather 
than seeing them in necessary opposition to one another. This attempt to balance emotions and 
reason, rather than denying the relevance of the former to argumentation, will appear in the 
examination of victim impact testimony, in that the court is aiming for emotions playing a role in 
structured argument without their overwhelming the reasoning process. 
What we need, then, are criteria by which emotional data can be warranted in 
argumentation. An account of the emotions that is particularly useful for this discussion of the 
reasonable use of emotional appeals is that of Peter Goldie, who finds three notions particularly 
‘important in understanding, explaining, and predicting what we think, feel, and do in emotional 
experience: … intelligibility, appropriateness, and proportionality’ (2000, p. 3). Intelligibility has 
to do with the ‘relationship between an emotion and the beliefs involved’ (2000, p. 20): we find 
it intelligible if someone is afraid of something they believe to be dangerous. For example, if 
someone is ‘irrationally’ afraid of dogs, that fear might be unintelligible to a dog lover until it is 
explained that she was attacked by a dog at a young age. Goldie also claims that ‘it is possible 
for an emotion to be intelligible but either inappropriate or disproportionate given the beliefs 
which putatively ground it’ (2000, p. 23). Appropriateness and proportionality are particularly 
culturally defined, so that the loud displays of grief common to many cultures seem excessive or 
unseemly to people from other cultures. The separability of these three notions makes them 
much more precise than a blanket attribution of rationality or irrationality to emotional states; 
what someone might judge as an ‘irrational’ emotional response could be that the relation 
between the stimulus and response is unintelligible or that the response seems disproportionate to 
the stimulus or that the response seems inappropriate given the stimulus. What we will find when 
we look at victim impact testimony is that intelligibility, appropriateness, and proportionality 
become the criteria used in the courtroom for whether victim impact testimony is to be allowed 
and what specific testimony will be allowed.  
Goldie is not here using the term ‘rationality’ in the specific way that Toulmin uses it, in 
contrast to reasonableness, but his three notions of intelligibility, appropriateness, and 
proportionality do relate to Toulmin’s characterization of reasonableness as being particular, 
local, and timely. Proportionality and appropriateness are inherently criteria belonging to 
particular situations situated in time: the exuberance displayed at sporting events, for example, 
would be inappropriate at a funeral or an academic symposium and disproportionate if displayed 
at a wine-tasting or symphony. The culturally bound nature of proportionality and 
appropriateness are by definition part of Toulmin’s description of reasonableness being ‘local’: 
the particular exuberance exhibited by soccer/football hooligans is generally considered 
excessive even in the United States.  
These three notions, intelligibility, proportionality, and appropriateness, provide the 
criteria that are used in courtrooms in the U.S. to determine whether emotionally laden testimony 
is allowable. What will become evident in the next section is that two balancing acts are taking 
place in the admission of this kind of evidence during the Oklahoma City bombing trial: finding 
a balance between admitting emotional evidence in the service of argumentation without 
overwhelming the jury’s reasoning process with it, and the balance between the appropriateness 
and proportionality of what emotion can be brought into a courtroom and the appropriateness and 
proportionality of emotions on the scene and in the aftermath of the bombing itself. Testimony 
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about emotional impact tries to make it intelligible without allowing emotions to override reason 
in the jury’s deliberations. 
 
3. EMOTION AND THE OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING TRIAL 
 
To illustrate how emotion is seen as a part of practical reasoning in contemporary U.S. society, I 
would like to examine the deliberations over the use of victim impact testimony during the trial 
of Timothy McVeigh for bombing the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, USA on April 19, 1995. Although 168 people died as a result of the blast, including 
19 children who were in a daycare center in the building, McVeigh was charged with only eight 
counts of first-degree murder for the federal agents killed, in addition to one count of conspiracy 
to use a weapon of mass destruction, one count of use of a weapon of mass destruction, and one 
count of destruction by explosives (United States v. McVeigh 1998). An issue that came up 
during the trial was what victim impact testimony would be allowed. The term ‘victim impact 
testimony’ covers three types of testimony in the sentencing phase of U.S. death penalty trials: 
testimony given by witnesses as to the immediate and long-term effects of the crime, testimony 
about the previous lives of the victims of the crime, and summary statements made by 
prosecutors concerning these two. In using this case, I want to acknowledge the ethically 
problematic situations in which victim impact testimony is used: it is used by the prosecution to 
persuade juries to impose the death penalty on a defendant, most often for the crime of first-
degree murder. Most developed nations do not have the death penalty and consider its use in the 
U.S. as barbaric.
1
 I do not use the example of victim impact testimony because I advocate the 
death penalty; rather, I am using it because it provides a clear case of reasoning about the use and 
limitations of emotional testimony, and thus provides us with a case study that will illuminate the 
role of pathos in Toulmin’s analysis of argumentation.  
The question of whether victim impact testimony is appropriate in judicial argument 
highlights the contradictory warrants that can exist in any field of argumentation. If the field of 
argumentation about sentencing decisions is defined strictly in terms of the crime and the 
defendant, then victim impact testimony is prejudicial, unwarranted. If, however, the field is 
defined more broadly—taking into account the predictable effects of the crime on family, 
associates, and society—or more adversarially—allowing aggravating circumstances to be 
testified to because extenuating circumstances are testifiable, then victim impact testimony is 
allowable. The United States has had a mixed history concerning the use of victim impact 
testimony. In 1987, the Supreme Court ruled in Booth v. Maryland that victim impact testimony 
is impermissible according to the Federal Constitution’s Eight Amendment ban on ‘cruel and 
unusual punishment’ because ‘evidence relating to a particular victim or to the harm that a 
 
1
 In the U.S., opinion is mixed about the death penalty. In a December 2004 Quinnipiac University poll, 62% of 
respondents support the death penalty, a figure which drops to 42% when respondents were given a choice of the 
death penalty or life without parole (46%). An earlier Gallup poll (May 2003) shows an ideological divide about the 
death penalty: ‘among ideological conservatives, 62% favor the death penalty and 36% prefer life imprisonment. 
Among ideological liberals, 37% prefer the death penalty and 60% prefer life imprisonment’ (‘Summaries of Recent 
Poll Findings’, 2005). Jurors in a death penalty case would be examined as to their views on the death penalty and, I 
assume, adamant opponents of the death penalty would be eliminated from the pool. It is interesting that judicial 
votes in the Payne v. Tennessee, which would presumably make it easier for prosecutors to get the death penalty, did 
not fall along ideological lines: while the three dissenters, Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, are all liberal-
to-moderate, concurring votes were cast by justices as diverse as David Souter, a moderate liberal, Sandra Day 
O’Connor, a moderate, and Antonin Scalia, a conservative. 
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capital defendant causes to a victim’s family does not in general reflect on the defendant’s 
‘blameworthiness’’ and ‘only evidence relating to ‘blameworthiness’ is relevant to the capital 
sentencing decision’ (Payne v. Tenn., 1991). Earlier courts had ruled that the defendant was 
allowed to present a wide range of evidence about mitigating factors in order to show the 
defendant as a ‘unique human being’; part of the ruling in Booth says that ‘the obligation to 
consider the defendant’s uniqueness limits the data about the crime’s impact, on which a 
defendant’s moral guilt may be calculated, to the facts he specifically knew and presumably 
considered. His uniqueness, in other words, is defined by the specifics of his knowledge and the 
reasoning that is thought to follow from it’ (Payne v. Tenn., 1991). This ruling was extended to 
include prosecutors’ statements in a subsequent ruling, South Carolina v. Gathers in 1989 (Payne 
v. Tenn., 1991).  
Both of these rulings were overturned in 1991 by the Supreme Court in Payne v. 
Tennessee, when the Court found that ‘the assessment of harm caused by the defendant as a 
result of the crime charged has long been an important concern of criminal law’ and ‘victim 
impact testimony is simply another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about 
the specific harm caused by the crime in question’ (Payne v. Tenn., 1991). The decision also 
acknowledged the possibility of misuse of victim impact testimony, but allowed that ‘in the 
event that victim impact evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the 
trial fundamentally unfair, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a 
mechanism for relief’ (Payne v. Tenn., 1991). Victim impact testimony is needed to show ‘each 
victim’s ‘uniqueness as an individual human being’’; the Court found that denying it turns ‘the 
victim into a ‘faceless stranger’’, ‘deprives the State of the full moral force of its evidence and 
may prevent the jury from having before it all the information necessary to determine the proper 
punishment for a first-degree murder’ (Payne v. Tenn., 1991). In a concurring opinion, Justice 
Souter deals at length with the question of the defendant’s knowledge about his or her victim. I 
will quote this long passage because it demonstrates the justification for allowing victim impact 
testimony: 
 
Murder has foreseeable consequences. When it happens, it is always to distinct individuals, and, after it 
happens, other victims are left behind. Every defendant knows, if endowed with the mental competence for 
criminal responsibility, that the life he will take by his homicidal behavior is that of a unique person, like 
himself, and that the person to be killed probably has close associates, ‘survivors’, who will suffer harms 
and deprivations from the victim’s death. Just as defendants know that they are not faceless human ciphers, 
they know that their victims are not valueless fungibles; and just as defendants appreciate the web of 
relationships and dependencies in which they live, they know that their victims are not human islands, but 
individuals with parents or children, spouses or friends or dependants. Thus, when a defendant chooses to 
kill, or to raise the risk of a victim’s death, this choice necessarily relates to a whole human being and 
threatens an association of others, who may be distinctly hurt. The fact that the defendant may not know the 
details of the victim’s life and characteristics, or the exact identities and needs of those who may survive, 
should not in any way obscure the further facts that death is always to a ‘unique’ individual, and harm to 
some group of survivors is a consequence of a successful homicidal act so foreseeable as to be virtually 
inevitable. (Payne v. Tenn., 1991) 
 
This passage speaks to the value of victim impact testimony in making the impact of first-degree 
murder intelligible. Payne v. Tennessee, then, provides the backing for the warrants that allow 
potentially emotion-laden victim impact testimony in cases like the Oklahoma City bombing trial 
of Timothy McVeigh. 
In what follows, I primarily examine arguments made at the beginning of the sentencing 
phase of Timothy McVeigh’s trial about the admissibility of particular pieces of victim impact 
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testimony and evidence. In these arguments, we will see how concerns about appropriateness and 
proportionality are addressed, as well as issues about the probative value of emotional testimony. 
Opinions on whether Judge Richard Matsch succeeded in allowing only appropriate victim 
impact testimony vary: John Gibeaut, a reporter for the American Bar Association Journal, 
claims that ‘a stern judge nearly lost control of the proceedings after prosecutors presented a 
parade of witnesses to describe the blast’s aftermath’ (1997). Ryan Ross, also writing for the 
ABA Journal, characterizes the trial as ‘circus-free’ and ‘no-nonsense’ (1997). As we examine 
the trial transcripts, the careful scrutiny that Judge Matsch gave the proposed victim impact 
testimony will become evident. 
Matsch himself gives a summary of the issues surrounding victim impact testimony 
during the preliminary arguments of the sentencing phase. He speaks to the differences between 
the emotional impact experienced by victims and survivors and the type of evidence allowable 
by law as follows: 
 
I appreciate the efforts made by Government counsel here to resist what I’m sure is strong effort by those 
most directly affected here to tell the whole story. I mean, I understand that. That’s part of the response. 
That is a human response to this event and this—all of the aftermath. But of course, what these lawyers 
representing the Government know and what they’re doing here is to acknowledge and try professionally to 
accommodate that interest but also their obligation to the law and to the Court to ensure that this hearing 
will be conducted in a manner that is consistent with the limitations that the Constitution commands, 
knowing that those limitations are not at all clear. (U.S. v. McVeigh, 1997) 
 
Matsch is here differentiating between what emotions were experienced by those directly 
affected by the bombing and what kinds of emotional testimony are appropriate in a court of law. 
He recognizes that that line is hard to draw, even given the backing of Payne v. Tennessee: 
 
Payne v. Tennessee involved, you know, cautions given by every justice who wrote; and almost every 
justice wrote in that case. And there simply is no clear guidance as to where the line between appropriate, 
particularly victim-impact testimony ends and an appeal to passion, the human reactions, emotive reactions 
of revenge, rage, empathy—all those things—begins. So I know that these rulings are not going to be 
consistent with the views of many; but nonetheless, we have to guard this hearing to ensure that the 
ultimate result and the jury’s decision be one made as a truly moral response to appropriate information, 
rather than an emotional response. (U.S. v. McVeigh, 1997) 
 
These are the poles along which the proposed testimony is judged: will it help the jury make a 
‘reasoned moral judgment’, or will it ‘risk upsetting the balance between emotion and reason’ 
(U.S. v. McVeigh, 1997)?
2
 In arguing against various pieces of victim impact testimony and 
evidence, the defense stresses its emotional content; in arguing for them, the prosecution stresses 
their factual nature and the fact that they are warranted by Payne v. Tennessee. In the following, 
I examine some of these arguments in light of Goldie’s criteria of appropriateness and 
proportionality.  
The first category of testimony that the defense objected to as being inappropriate 
concerns the way that victims were going to be portrayed. Speaking for the defense, Richard 
Burr claims that some of the testimony was eulogistic, ‘overly idealizing, as we all do, in 
eulogies to our loved ones, idealizing the person and presenting a sentimental view’ (U.S. v. 
Timothy McVeigh, 1997). Related to that is their concern about ‘memorializing the kind of 
testimony—or kind of statements that one might make at a funeral, designed to evoke empathetic 
 
2
 The former quotation is from prosecution attorney Sean Connelly; the latter from defense attorney Richard Burr. 
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identification with the person who has been lost, not dealing with the facts of the loss’ (U.S. v. 
Timothy McVeigh, 1997). In both cases, the defense suggests occasions in which the evidence 
would be appropriate (eulogies, funerals) in order to contrast with the inappropriateness of their 
use in a law court. They also repeatedly, as here, argue that the purpose of the testimony is to 
inappropriately sway the jury’s decision through emotions rather than aid in reasoned decision-
making, which would be appropriate in the circumstances. When the defense later argues against 
testimony as to the careers of two law enforcement officers who died in that it inappropriately 
‘risks changing the focus in the way that, that Payne and the statute guide against’, Judge Matsch 
asks him whether ‘one of the appropriate things to be considered here is the effect of the loss of 
the life of the victim; the effect in terms of impact on the community.’ Defense attorney Burr 
replies ‘in a limited factual way, yes, if there a function that person served that is sorely missed’ 
(U.S. v. McVeigh, 1997). The defense clearly wants the prosecution’s case to be strictly limited 
according to the narrowest possible standards of appropriateness. 
The prosecution’s answer to these claims about inappropriateness of the testimony is to 
stress the factual nature of the evidence they were going to present: ‘what we intend to do with 
victim impact testimony is to call some 40 to 45 witnesses…to offer objective factual testimony 
about the circumstances of the offense and the effects they felt from the offense’; ‘what we do 
intend to offer…is an objective story’; ‘it will basically just be very objective, factual testimony’ 
(U.S. v. McVeigh, 1997). This is their response to the defense’s claims about over-idealizing and 
sentimentalizing the victims. They also claim that the brevity of their presentations is a guarantor 
of their appropriateness. Implicitly comparing their planned testimony to Payne v. Tennessee’s 
balancing of the defendant as a unique individual and the victim as an individual, prosecutor 
Sean Connelly argues ‘the jury will certainly know more about the defendant individually at the 
end of the process than it knows about any one of these victims or even, I would say, the victims 
who testify all together’ (U.S. v. McVeigh, 1997). If it is appropriate for the jury to get to know 
McVeigh, Connelly implies, it is certainly appropriate for them to get to know the victims. 
Judge Matsch, too, has to make very careful decisions about the nature of what 
appropriate victim impact testimony would be. He speaks at various times about the 
‘foreseeability’ of the impact: if McVeigh could have foreseen the results of his actions, even if 
he did not have specific knowledge, then that was one criterion for allowing that piece of 
testimony or evidence in. A further line that he draws is to exclude evidence that pull in 
emotional reactions about something other than the bombing. Matsch questions Connelly about 
some photographs the prosecution wanted to show in the following exchange: 
 
The Court: These are not special occasion photographs. They’re just ordinary photographs. 
Mr. Connelly: Some may be. One—there will be a couple of wedding photographs. 
The Court: No, there won’t… 
The Court: I have no problem with the family as a unit; but where there is an additional aspect to it, like 
Christmas or a wedding ceremony, those things have implications that go beyond just what the family unit 
consisted of. (U.S. v. McVeigh, 1997) 
 
The composition of the ‘family unit’ is factual; the addition of emotionally laden occasions is 
inappropriate. Matsch also tries to insure the appropriateness of the proposed testimony by 
asking the prosecution what function it would serve in argumentation, what claim it would serve 
as data for: ‘What does that go to?’ ‘What’s the value of that? What does it prove?’ (U.S. v. 
McVeigh, 1997). In answer, the prosecution often cited their backing as well as their claims: ‘I 
think it goes to the effect of the offense, and that’s under Payne’; ‘I think again under Payne…it 
identifies six of the victims’ (U.S. v. McVeigh, 1997). 
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The defense, prosecution, and judge also speak to the proportionality of the proposed 
evidence and testimony, not referring to its proportionality with the crime but to its 
proportionality with the goal of the jury being able to make a reasoned judgment in the case. The 
defense argues that the prosecution’s evidence and testimony would be ‘gruesome and graphic’ 
and that it would contain ‘highly charged emotional statements…There are some statements that 
seem simply to go beyond the limit of emotional content and risk upsetting the balance between 
emotion and reason’ (U.S. v. McVeigh, 1997). Judge Matsch, too, expresses his concern about 
material being ‘incendiary and prejudicial’ (U.S. v. McVeigh, 1997). 
In response to these concerns, the prosecution did not just emphasize the factuality of its 
proposed presentation, but also argued that the defense was trying to use the wrong measure of 
proportionality in their objections: 
 
Where we do have differences with the defense is in terms of the notion the defense has that we need to 
prove these facts in the least prejudicial manner, in the sense that if we could prove a technical aggravating 
factor, that’s all we need to do. And I think the difference comes from Payne, where the court said we’re 
entitled to the moral force of the evidence as well. And I think we have done it in a way that is not 
gruesome. For example, we have not sought to offer any postmortem evidence of any of the deceased. 
We’re not looking to inflame the jury, to have them decide this case on passion, but rather to make a 
reasoned moral judgment. (U.S. v. McVeigh, 1997) 
 
Defense attorney Connelly thus takes issue with the defense’s representation of what is the 
proper proportionality for the display of emotion-laden testimony and evidence. Most of the 
prosecution’s argumentation concerning the defense’s objections about proportionality take the 
form of reassuring the judge of the factual and probative value of their planned case, although 
often Connelly says that they have decided to withdraw evidence they thought was too highly 
charged.  
What this examination of the arguments concerning the use of victim impact testimony in 
the Timothy McVeigh trial demonstrates is that the participants in the trial all have similar views 
on what role emotion-laden testimony and evidence should play in a court of law. Allowing 
testimony with emotional content makes the emotional impact of the bombing intelligible to the 
jury, but allowing testimony with disproportionate or inappropriate emotional content would 
‘warp’ the jury and render them incapable of making a ‘reasoned moral judgment as the 
conscience of the community as to the appropriate punishment’ (U.S. v. McVeigh, 1997). What 
constitutes disproportionate or inappropriate emotional testimony is determined through oral, 
particular, local, and timely argumentation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this essay, I have argued that the characterization of ‘reasonableness’ that grows from Stephen 
Toulmin’s early discomfort with the inapplicability of logic to practical argumentation allows 
pathos to play a role in reasonable argument. I distinguished between pathos as emotionally 
warping the judgment of the audience/jury and pathos as the insertion of emotionally-laden data 
into an argumentative framework, and used Peter Goldie’s criteria of the intelligibility, 
appropriateness, and proportionality to describe ways of judging that assertion. Finally, I used 
the arguments over victim impact testimony in the Timothy McVeigh trial as a case study to 
illustrate how arguments are made about the appropriateness and proportionality of emotion-
laden data in a court of law. In cases like this, emotional data are not antithetical to reasonable 
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decision-making, but are seen to enable juries and audiences to make reasonable moral 
judgments about the cases presented for their consideration. 
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